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Introduction 
 
Sound symbolism in the age of digital orality. 
A perspective on language beyond 'nature' and 'culture' 
Luca Nobile1 
 
Abstract 
After recalling the main empirical evidence in favour of sound symbolism, this Introduction 
presents the contributions offered by the authors of this issue of Signifiances (Signifying). It then 
addresses some of the epistemological and metaphysical issues that a full integration of sound 
symbolism into language theory entails, particularly concerning the relationship between 
language and reality, and between nature and culture. Finally, it proposes to explain the 
centuries-old preference of scholars for the arbitrariness of the sign as an effect of the pre-
eminent role that writing on paper has played in their pragmatic-cognitive experience of language 
up to the digital revolution. 
Keywords: iconicity; orality; writing; epistemology of language sciences; ecology of mind. 
 
Résumé 
Après avoir rappelé les principales preuves empiriques en faveur du symbolisme 
phonétique, cette Introduction présente les contributions offertes par les auteurs du présent 
numéro de Signifiances (Signifying). Elle aborde ensuite certains des enjeux 
épistémologiques et métaphysiques qu'une pleine intégration du symbolisme phonétique 
dans la théorie du langage comporte, concernant notamment le rapport entre langage et 
réalité, et entre nature et culture. Elle propose enfin d'expliquer la préférence 
pluriséculaire des savants pour l'arbitraire du signe comme un effet du rôle prééminent 
que l'écriture sur papier a joué dans leur expérience pragmatico-cognitive du langage 
jusqu'à la révolution numérique. 
Mots-clés: iconicité ; oralité ; écriture ; épistémologie des sciences du langage ; écologie 
de l'esprit.  
 
 
  
                                                        
1 UBFC - Université de Bourgogne et Franche-Comté / CPTC - Centre Pluridisciplinaire Textes et Cultures (EA 
4178). 
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1. Definitions 
Over the past century, sound symbolism has become one of the most well-established language 
facts within disciplines that have adopted the methods of the natural sciences, while remaining 
one of the most controversial from the point of view of the human and social sciences. Often 
neglected and sometimes repressed by the mainstream of general linguistics, partly because of 
its apparent contradiction with the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign (Saussure 1916), it 
has sometimes been defended by minority or peripheral trends, for example within African, 
Amerindian and Australian ethnolinguistics, and within Japanese, Korean and Turkish national 
traditions. 
However, the new millennium seems to be witnessing a change in the situation. While cognitive 
sciences continue to explore the topic, traditional linguistics of langue based on the arbitrariness 
of the sign seems to have lost its pre-eminence within the language sciences and is now part of 
a more diversified ecosystem, where pragmatics and cognitive semantics, NLP and corpus 
linguistics, sociolinguistics and the linguistics of speech, no longer necessarily make 
arbitrariness their unquestionable horizon, nor consequently the motivation of the sign their 
founding epistemological taboo. On the contrary, firmly rooted in the general problem of the 
embodiment of cognition, language approaches that take into account sound symbolism, once 
condemned as 'naturalistic', are now constantly opening up new horizons of research (see Figure 
1). 
Our hypothesis is that this change of perspective is not a contingency but reflects long-term 
dynamics of modern culture that are now being achieved. These terminal accelerations concern 
the relationship that humanity has both with its physical environment (nature), disrupted by two 
centuries of industrial revolution as it has never been since the Palaeolithic agricultural 
revolution, and with its psychological environment (culture), transformed in two decades by 
the most profound change in language technology it has ever seen since the invention of writing. 
The representation that science offers us of language, this natural and cultural behaviour that 
our species wanted to make the flag of its own specificity, can only evolve suddenly within the 
framework of such an acceleration, and it is now doing so, also in the field of the theory of the 
sign. Our ambition is to shed light on the transformation underway in this last area. 
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Figure 1 Historical frequency of the expression "sound symbolism" in different types of English 
publications. At the top, the relative frequency of "sound symbolism" (in blue) in books published between 
1900 and 2008, compared with that of other expressions of language science, "cognitive semantics" (in red) 
and "English phonetics" (in green), according to Google N-Gram Viewer. It can be seen that the use of the 
term becomes widespread in the late 1960s and remains relatively stable until today, fuelled mainly by 
research in the cognitive sciences. Below, the absolute frequency of "sound symbolism" in linguistic studies 
published between 1988 and 2018 and listed in the Brill Linguistic Bibliography. The median goes from 
about 1 new study per year in the 1990s to 8 new studies per year in the 2010s. The isolated peak in 1994 
corresponds to the publication of the collective volume edited by Hinton et al. (1994), who played a 
pioneering role in the field. 
 
This Introduction aims, on the one hand, to recall the now abundant evidence of the existence 
and non-marginal role of sound symbolism in languages, in order to introduce and put into 
perspective the original contributions that make up the issue and, on the other hand, to outline 
the framework for a theoretical discussion on the epistemological, metaphysical and political 
implications of this type of research, particularly concerning the relationship between language 
and reality and between nature and culture. 
To this end, we will adopt a broad definition of "sound symbolism", inspired by the one 
proposed by Hinton, Nichols and Ohala in their Introduction to Sound Symbolism (1994), and 
including in brief any form of motivation of the relationship between the phonological signifier 
of a word (or set of words) and its meaning, its concept or referent, whether it is an iconic 
motivation (that is by similarity) or indexical motivation (by proximity), imitative 
(onomatopoeic) or synesthetic (ideophonic), imagic (sensitive, or directly emerging from the 
syntagmatic axis) or diagrammatic (abstract, or emerging from the analysis of paradigmatic 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
XXXIX 
 
axis; see Nobile 2014a). Despite some shortcomings, this broad sense has many advantages, 
including flexibility, which is essential in a field that still largely remains to be explored, and 
which already includes a range of remarkably diverse phenomena in the world's different 
languages. In particular, Hinton and her colleagues distinguish, first, a "corporeal" sound 
symbolism, including interjections and prosody facts (for example, in French, the labial 
articulation of pouah! "ugh!" tends towards the outside and the nasal one of miam! "yummy!", 
inwards; while the pitch of the injunctive sentences tends towards the low and that of the 
interrogative sentences towards the high); secondly, an "imitative" sound symbolism, including 
onomatopoeias and words of onomatopoeic origin (e. g. meow, toc toc toc, tinkling, clapping, 
drum, bomb); thirdly, a "synesthetic" sound symbolism, including ideophones and expressive 
words (e. g. in French zig zag, bric-à-brac, dondon "chubby", gnangnan "namby-pamby", etc.); 
and fourthly a "conventional" sound symbolism, including particularly phonesthemes and other 
forms of diagrammatic iconicity whose motivation does not appear to be definitely linked to 
universal synesthetic mechanisms (for example, in French, 28 out of 35 verbs starting with fl- 
have a meaning related to the idea of a fluid movement, such as flairer "to smell sth", flamber 
"to blaze", flâner "to stroll" ou flotter "to float"; see below). 
From a semiotic point of view, sound symbolism is often classified among the phenomena of 
iconicity, Peirce's category (1885, 1903) indicating a relationship of similarity between the sign 
and the represented object, introduced in linguistics by Jakobson (1965). Linguistic sound 
symbolism (or phonetic symbolism) covers all phenomena of iconicity at the phonological level 
(thus excluding those that take place at the morphological, syntactic or textual levels, such as 
phenomena of order, dependence or emphasis). Among the facts of phonological iconicity that 
are part of sound symbolism, we can also distinguish, still according to Jakobson and Peirce's 
categorization, "images" (like most onomatopoeias), "diagrams" (most phonesthemes) and 
"metaphors" (like most ideophones; see Nobile 2014a for a more detailed analysis). It should 
be noted, however, that the expression "sound symbolism" (and "phonetic symbolism") may 
also refer to two classes of phenomena which, by definition, do not fit into phonological 
iconicity in the narrow sense. The first is represented by the phenomena of indexical sound 
symbolism, where motivation depends more on a proximity relationship than on similarity, and 
is therefore better classified as a Peircian index than as an icon (for example, interjections such 
as pouah! vs. yummy! seen before, which seem to indicate by their articulation a direction 
towards the outside or inside of the body; or cases of articulatory self-reference of the phonatory 
organs such as the nasal /n/ in nose, the dental /t/ in tooth, the "guttural" /g/ in gullet etc.; or 
other cases of articulatory self-reference such as gargle, spit, blow, sniff; or cases of pronominal 
deixis like tu "you" and vous "you, pl.", articulated more forward than je "I" and nous "us"; see 
below). The second class of phenomena included in sound symbolism and not strictly related 
to phonological iconicity is represented by the phenomena of "poietic" or enactive sound 
symbolism, in which motivation does not depend so much on the similarity or proximity of the 
signifier to a given meaning, but rather on its ability, true or presumed, to shape the latter in its 
own image in the mind of the speaking subject, a property well known by anthropologists 
because it is traditionally highlighted in inspired language (poetic, prophetic and oracular 
language ; enchantments, mantras, ritual songs, and so on). 
2. Evidence 
From the point of view of the methods derived from the natural sciences, the existence of sound 
symbolism is firmly demonstrated by two fundamental types of empirical evidence: 
experimental and descriptive evidence. 
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2.1 Experiments 
The experimental evidence comes mainly from psycholinguistics and cognitive neuroscience. 
They attest, on the behavioural and neurophysiological level, respectively, to the sensitivity of 
the human cognitive system to the correspondences, most often synesthetic or cross modal, 
between the acoustic and articulatory properties of speech sounds on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, the sensory or psychological properties of the realities to which these sounds refer.  
The first experimental psychology research in this field dates back to 1929. This is the year in 
which the experimentum mentis of the American naturalized German psychologist Wolfgang 
Köhler and the results of the experience of the German-born American linguist Edward Sapir 
are published simultaneously and independently in the United States. The first suggests in his 
book Gestalt Psychology (1929: 242-243; 1947: 254-255) the existence of a synesthetic 
correspondence between the pair of pseudo-words baluma vs takete (maluma since the 1947 
edition) and a pair of shapes, one rounded and the other spiky (see Figure 2). Experimentally 
verified by Charles Warren Fox in 1935, this Köhler's intuition represents the beginning of 
research on shape sound symbolism. The second demonstrates in his article "A study in phonetic 
symbolism" (1929) the correspondence between the vowels degree of aperture in pseudo-words 
like mal vs mil and the perception of their "greatness" or "smallness" by speakers; this is the 
beginning of research on size sound symbolism. After these first results one must mention at 
least the important work of Sapir's disciple, Stanley Newman (1933), who demonstrates that 
the size effect {large vs small} can also be obtained by coupling pseudo-words differentiated 
by [back vs. front] or [long vs. short] vowels or even by [voicing vs. voiceless] consonants, and 
that the same pairs of pseudo-words, with a few exceptions (long vs. short), also tend to produce 
a luminosity effect {dark vs. bright}; this is the starting point for research on shine sound 
symbolism (see Nobile 2014b for more details). 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Acoustic oscillogram analysis of the pseudo-words takete and maluma used by Wolfgang Köhler 
(1947) in his seminal experiment on shape sound symbolism. Because of its voiceless plosives, the sound of 
takete is discontinuous, as are the lines of the figure with which it is associated, while that of maluma is 
continuous thanks to its sonorants, as are the lines of the other figure (Nobile 2015). 
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In the 90 years since these beginnings, experimental research on sound symbolism has 
expanded and consolidated remarkably. It explored the different sensory modalities and dozens 
of different phonological systems. It has also multiplied its approaches and modernized its 
methods. 
Initially, for example, R. Davis (1961) reproduced Köhler's experience with Swahili speakers 
in Tanganyika and confirmed the expected result. Later Taylor and Taylor (1962) tested the 
Sapir protocol with English, Japanese, Korean and Tamil speakers, who were questioned not 
only on the size but also on the activity, temperature and sweetness of the pseudo-words, and 
they found a partial inter-linguistic variation in the results. In France, Maxime Chastaing (1958, 
1962, 1964, 1966) confirmed most of Newman's results by also adding a test on the strength, 
hardness and roughness of /ʀ/, as opposed to the weakness, softness and smoothness of /l/, at 
same time that Jean-Michel Peterfalvi (1964, 1965, 1966, 1970) replicated Köhler's experience, 
while retracing a history of research on sound symbolism and proposing psycho-physiological 
explanations of the main results (cf. Nobile 2014b for a critical analysis of his contribution). 
For his part, Bernard Lyman (1979), by inaugurating a new subfield of research, was able to 
associate about thirty complex feelings with Köhler's two figures (and thus indirectly with the 
pseudo-words maluma vs takete): calm, eternity, friendship, happiness, home, love, sadness and 
wisdom were thus associated with the rounded figure, while anxiety, anger, courage, 
excitement, fear, frustration, hostility, nervousness, resentment and worry were associated with 
the sharp figure. 
On the threshold of the new millennium, Richard Klink (2000) has provided one of the most 
significant applications of sound symbolism in marketing, Susan Parault and Paula 
Schwanenflugel (2006) have tested its applicability to the field of language learning and 
Mutsumi Imai et al. (2008), and Katerina Kantartzis et al. (2011) have shown its significant 
role in children's language acquisition. Research on sound symbolism then moved into the 
sensory domain of tastes and aromas [see Luca Nobile and Jordi Ballester (2017) for a detailed 
overview]. For example, Julia Simner et al (2010) and Anne-Sylvie Crisinel et al. (2012) have 
shown that sweetness tends to be associated with high, rounded, low-pitched vowels (/o/, /u/) 
and continuous, sonorant, low-pitched consonants (/m/, /n/, /l/), while sourness and saltiness 
are rather associated with low, high-pitched vowels (/a/, /ɛ/) and high-pitched, rough, 
discontinuous consonants (/k/, /t/, /r/). Another sensory domain recently explored was that of 
gestures and actions. For example, Maurizio Gentilucci and Michael Corballis (2006) have 
shown that speakers tend to pronounce the vowel /a/ more open when they grasp (or see grasp) 
larger objects, and pronounce it more closed when they deal with smaller objects. On the other 
hand,  Noburo Saji et al. (2013) have shown that the opposition between voiced consonants 
(/b/, /d/, /g/, low-pitched) and voiceless consonants (/p/, /t/, /k/, high-pitched) is associated with 
the difference between a heavy, slow gait and a light, fast gait, both among Japanese and Anglo-
Saxon speakers (while on other properties the two languages differ). The most recent studies 
also attempt to differentiate the phonosymbolic values of different distinctive features. For 
example, Luca Nobile (2015), after analysing the acoustic properties of pseudowords maluma 
and takete (see Figure 2), showed that their consonant features can react differently to different 
types of figures, while Klemens Knoeferle and his colleagues (2017) showed that vowel 
features react differently to different types of phonetic symbolism: both size and shape sound 
symbolism are related to the frequency of the F2 formant (i.e. the place of articulation of the 
vowels and their lip rounding); only the size sound symbolism, however, is also related to the 
duration of the vowel and the frequency of the F1 formant (i.e. the degree of aperture). 
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Figure 3 Neurophysiological correlates of sound symbolism. On the left, the left superior parietal region (in 
green) identified by Kate Pirog Revill et al (2014) through the fMRI, which fires distinctively when a sound-
symbolic correspondence is perceived between the phonological signifiers of an unknown language and their 
meanings. On the right, the electronegativity peak detected in the occipital lobe by Vanja Ković et al. (2010) 
using the EEG when subjects perceive a sound-symbolic correspondence between pseudo-words and 
congruent figures. 
 
Over the past decade, there has also been experimental evidence of a neurophysiological nature, 
i. e. based on direct observation of brain physiology and no longer only on the behaviour of 
individuals (see Figure 3). In particular, Kate Pirog Revill and her colleagues (2014) were able 
to identify through fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) a region of the cortex that 
is activated distinctively when Anglo-Saxon speakers perceive foreign language antonyms as 
sound-symbolic (the left superior parietal area, within BA7), as well as a subcortical region that 
is activated in proportion to individual sensitivity to sound symbolism (the underlying left 
superior longitudinal fasciculus). In turn, Vanja Ković and colleagues (2010) have shown by 
the EEG (Electro-Encephalogram) that when individuals perceive a sound-symbolic 
congruence between a pseudo-word and the shape of a figure, the visual cortex records a 
negative electrical peak between 140 and 180 milliseconds after the presentation of the shape 
(a too rapid reaction to be attributed to conscious activity, thus reflecting a possible 
preconscious sound symbolic association).  
2.2 Descriptions  
Descriptive evidence attests to the existence of sound symbolism, not through the observation 
of individuals' cognitive systems, but through the analysis of the lexical repertoire of languages. 
It is traditionally provided, on the one hand, by anthropolinguistics and ethnolinguistics 
(particularly in the African, Amerindian, South-East Asian and Oceanian domains) and, on the 
other hand, by a number of national or regional linguistic traditions (Anglo-Saxon, Japanese, 
Korean, Turkish, Basque, etc.). Recent research based on computerized corpora now makes it 
possible to specify, consolidate and generalize, more and more frequently, this traditional 
knowledge.  
Unlike experimental research, descriptive research on sound symbolism is very ancient. It can 
even be said that Western linguistic thought begins with a research of this type: the one that 
Plato had Socrates detail in the Cratyle at the beginning of the 4th century BC (421c-427d). 
Defended later by Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus (75-76) against the conventionalist 
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Aristotle of De Interpretatione (16a), this approach remained widely practiced in antiquity, for 
example by the Roman scholar Nigidius Figulus (in Gellius, Noctes atticae, X, 4), mainly 
through the teaching of the Stoics, whose ideas were reported to us by Augustine of Hippo in 
his De Dialectica (ch. 6 and 7) towards the end of the 4th century AD.  
At the height of medieval scholasticism, Henri de Gand (Summa quaestionum ordinariarum ch. 
73, in Rosier 1995) takes up and perfects Augustine's imitative theory in order to oppose it both 
to Thomas Aquinas Aristotelian conventionalism, which is about to become the official theory 
of the Church, and to the mystical theories of heretics and cabalists, in particular that of 
Abraham Aboulafia's "prophetic" qabbalah (see Scholem 1946).  
In modern Europe, descriptive research on sound symbolism, always opposing both mystical 
theories such as Jakob Böhme's (1635) and conventionalist theories such as Locke's one (1690), 
marks some of the decisive steps in the constitution of national linguistic-grammatical 
traditions: John Wallis (1653) and Hensleigh Wedgwood (1845, 1866) in England, Leibniz 
(1710, 1712, 1765) and Humboldt (1822, 1836) in Germany, Giambattista Vico (1744) and 
Melchiorre Cesarotti (1785) in Italy, Charles de Brosses (1765), Charles Nodier (1808, 1834), 
Abel François Villemain (1835) and Honoré Chavée (1849) in France, Mikhail Lomonosov 
(1748) in Russia and even Akira Suzuki (1816) in Japan are only the most significant figures in 
this inexhaustible investigation of the imitative virtues of language. 
The beginning of the contemporary age can be located, for this type of research (as for the rest 
of linguistics) in the last third of the 19th century, when the general domain of imitation and 
analogy (18th century keywords) begins to integrate into dominant scientific paradigms, that 
of historical grammar first, then that of general linguistics, while giving rise to more 
circumscribed and precise concepts such as those of sound symbolism (Gabelentz, 1891[1901: 
328], Jespersen, 1922: 396, Hjelmslev, 1928: 171), iconicity (Peirce 1885, Jakobson 1965), 
expressiveness (Grammont 1901, 1933: 403), phonesthesia (Firth 1930) and ideophony (Doke 
1935), in addition to onomatopoeia and interjection, terms well known since antiquity. 
Ideophones are lexical forms that function as empowered onomatopoeias representing by their 
sound not only environmental sounds but also non-sound phenomena, such as colours, shapes, 
tastes, smells, gestures, feelings or trajectories (as in French zig zag, bric-à-brac, chichi "fuss", 
dondon "chubby" or gnangnan "namby-pamby"). Relatively rare in Indo-European languages, 
they are numerous and frequent in many languages without writing (Amerindian, African, 
Australian languages, etc.) as well as in the oral or poetic varieties of several literary languages 
(Japanese, Turkish, Korean, etc.), where they generally play a role of adjectives or adverbs. The 
works of Bernhard Schlegel (1857), Harry Peck (1886), William Aston (1894), Diedrich 
Westermann (1907) and Louis Hjelmslev (1928: 171-189) contain the first scientific 
descriptions of ideophony, before Clement Doke (1935) defined and popularized the term, and 
the field matured with the syntheses of William Samarin (1965, 1971), Gerard Diffloth (1972), 
George Childs (1994) and Shoko Hamano (1998), then with the great collective works 
published by Erhard Voeltz and Christa Kilian-Hatz (2001) and, more recently, by Kimi Akita 
and Prashant Pardeshi (2019). Today, among the most active researchers we can mention at 
least Mark Dingemanse (2011, 2012, 2018) for African studies and Kimi Akita (2009, 2011, 
2012) for Japanese.  
Phonesthemes, on the other hand, are consonant or syllabic groups of sub-morphemic level that 
tend to associate with similar meanings within a language, without this semantic connotation 
necessarily being explicable by a universal synesthetic link. One of the most frequently cited 
examples is the initial cluster gl- in English (glare, glance, glitter, glitter, glimmer, glimpse etc.), 
referring to a movement of light or sight in 50% of the cases, which represents a frequency 
significantly higher than random. Similarly, if we take all 35 French verbs in fl- we can easily 
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see that at least 28 of them (80%) share the reference to a fluid type of movement (that is aerial, 
light, flexible, often cyclical or unstable), as is the case for flageller "flagellate", flageoler 
"wobble", flairer "pick up the scent of", flamber "burn", flamboyer "blaze", flâner "saunter", 
flatter "flatter, stroke", fléchir "bend", fleurir "flower", flipper "freak out", floconner "fall in 
light flakes", flotter "float", fluer "flow", flûter "play the flute, drink". Now, even if it were 
assumed that such a connotation usually characterises an half of the French verbs (which 
obviously means overestimating it by a wide margin), there would be less than one probability 
per thousand (p < 0.001) that, in the case of the fl- verbs, this percentage rises to 80% by pure 
chance. On the other hand, the articulatory and acoustic properties of the /fl/ cluster constitute 
a plausible motivating factor, given that the voiceless fricative /f/ is one of the most suitable to 
represent an light aerial noise (with /s/) and that the lateral approximant /l/ is in turn one of the 
consonants that exert the least resistance to the passage of air. To verify, it will be sufficient to 
compare this dominant connotation of fl- verbs with the profoundly different connotation of 
fr- verbs, which are often characterized, on the contrary, by an idea of movement with friction, 
rigidity or rupture: fractionner "fractionate", fracturer "fracture", fragiliser "weaken, make 
breakable", fragmenter "fragment", franchir "cross", frapper "strike", frauder "fraud", frayer 
"open sth up", freiner "brake", frelater "adulterate", frictionner "rub", frigorifier "freeze", 
frotter "rub, scrape", frustrer "frustrate". This connotation adapts well to the acoustic and 
articulatory properties of /ʀ/, a voiced fricative ([ʁ]) sometimes realized as a vibrant ([ʀ]), 
characterized by a rough psychoacoustic profile (Zwicker and Fastl 1999: 257). Although the 
word phonestheme was introduced by Firth (1930), the phenomenon has always been well 
known by Anglo-Saxon grammarians, since Wallis (1653: XIV) up to Bloomfield (1933). 
Among recent works one can cite Bowles' (1995, 1998) and Bottineau's (2008) detailed 
qualitative analyses, Hutchins' (1998) phonesthemes recognition tests, Bergen's (2004) 
experimental demonstration of their preconscious and quasi-morphological cognitive treatment, 
Philps' (2008 and 2011) study of their diachronic behaviour and Otis' and Sagi's (2008), 
Abramova's and Fernandez' (2016) and Kwon's (2017) quantitative analyses on large 
computerized corpora. The study of phonesthemes is not limited to English: Abelin (1999), for 
example, have studied them in Swedish, Blust (2003) in the Austronesian languages and Bohas 
and Dat (2007) have identified equivalent structures in Semitic languages. 
Of course, interjections, onomatopoeias, ideophones and phonesthemes, while representing the 
most recognizable forms of sound symbolism, do not exhaust the typology of phenomena. 
Actually, any linguistic form or structure is likely to be analysed from the point of view of its 
phonological motivation (provided, of course, that appropriate demonstration methods are put 
in place). Among the most studied general facts are, for example, deictics, diminutives and self-
referential articulatory phenomena. A case of pronominal indexical motivation is the fact that 
in most languages the second person (tu, vous) tends to be articulated further in front than the 
first person (je, nous; cf. Wichmann et al. 2010 and Nobile 2011 and 2012; as well as, well 
before them, Nigidius, in Gelle, Noctes Atticae, X, 4; de Brosses 1765: 271 and Villemain 1835: 
xxvi-xxvii). On the other hand, diminutives tend to prefer higher-pitched phonemes than 
augmentatives (cf. Jakobson 1965, Ultan 1978, Haynie et al. 2014, Nobile 2010) and the names 
of phonatory organs tend to use articulations produced by these organs (cf. Urban 2011; and 
before him De Brosses 1765: 247-251 and Nodier 1808: xviii-xix). More generally, recent 
studies on large corpora show that, as a whole, etymologically independent words tend to be 
phonologically more similar when they are semantically similar, whether analysed within a 
language (English in Monaghan et al. 2014) or over hundreds (Dautriche 2016) or thousands 
of different languages (Wichman et al. 2010, Blasi et al. 2016). In addition, this general trend 
towards phonological iconicity is significantly greater in the lexicon learned orally in early 
childhood than in the lexicon learned in school and adulthood through reading and writing 
(Monaghan et al. 2014, Perry et al. 2015, Massaro and Perlman 2017; see Figure 5 below). 
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3. Contributions 
The articles collected in this issue come from the international conference Sound Symbolism 
and Crossmodal Correspondences, held in Paris, Sorbonne University, on May 4 and 5, 2017. 
Philippe Monneret proposes a theoretical perspective on sound symbolism, conceived as part 
of his theory of analogy. In his view, in contemporary international research, sound symbolism 
is often categorized in terms of a Peircian-Jakobsonian inspired semiotic theory and conceived 
as a phonological form of iconicity. Philippe Monneret proposes to adopt a different perspective 
and to conceive it first of all from the point of view of the analogical cognitive operations that 
are set up to experience them.   
Fanny Boudier conducts a quantitative analysis of monosyllabic verbs in French in search of a 
type of conventional sound symbolism that she calls "systematicity" (and that one could also 
call "diagrammatic iconicity"). She studies the phonological distribution of transitive, 
intransitive and dual-use verbs and obtains several significant results, the most important of 
which is the preference of initial sonorants (nasals, laterals, semiconsonants and vowels) for 
transitive verbs. She also shows that this result is part of a trend towards a systematic 
relationship between phonological structures and grammatical structures that is well attested in 
other languages.  
Chris Smith aims to evaluate the influence that the sound symbolic value of the English 
phonestheme fl- (traditionally associated with a more or less fluid, confused or chaotic 
movement), may have had in diachrony on the semantic change of the words that contained it. 
Her analysis suggests that the current phonestheme is the result of a historical convergence 
between several etymologically independent lexical bases, whose meaning has tended to 
approach each other because of the sound symbolic attraction of the signifier. 
Nezihe Zeybek studies the relationship between vowel alternation and semantic alternation in 
Turkish ideophones. After having illustrated the main phono-morphological characteristics of 
the Turkish ideophonic system, she distinguishes between external vowel alternation (which 
take place between two different words) and internal alternation (which take place within the 
same word, reduplicated). In the first case, the phonological opposition between [open vs. 
closed] and [high-pitched vs. low-pitched] vowels usually represents semantic oppositions such 
as {large vs. small} or {strong vs. weak}. In the second case, the alternation between different 
vowels within a reduplicated ideophone usually represents irregularity, imperfection or 
inconvenience. 
Sandra Madureira, Mario Augusto de Souza Fontes and Zuleica Camargo present a broad 
overview of research on sound symbolism by illustrating research that is sometimes little known 
to the French-speaking public. After having distinguished between sound symbolism and 
phonetic metaphors (Fonagy), the authors discuss four types of physiological "codes" that can 
operate as sound symbolic signifiers: the frequency code (Ohala), the effort code, the breathing 
code and the sirenian code (Gussenhoven). In relation to these four dimensions of 
expressiveness, the authors attempt to define a typology of the main articulatory gestures 
involved. 
Ekaterina Quantin-Voronova illustrates little-known aspects of Stanislav Voronin's (1935-2001) 
phonosemantic theory, focusing in particular on the notion of kinema, the gestural unity that the 
Russian linguist places at the base of sound symbolic correspondences between articulatory 
gestures and other bodily gestures, whether they are experienced or observed, emotional or 
motor. After retracing the author's highly elaborate system of conceptual dichotomies 
developed to categorize human gestuality, Voronova reproduces and comments on a number of 
examples from English. 
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Andrea Picciuolo explores the perlocutionary use of sound symbolism in a shamanic song of 
the Guna Amerindian people, the Muu Igala, aimed at treating pregnancy pathologies. 
According to Lévi-Strauss, who conducted a study on it, the mobilization of mythical 
archetypes by the structure of the song would be supposed to mobilize the patient's psychic 
structure and, in this way, reflect its effect on the physiology of her body so as to ensure healing. 
Picciuolo tests the hypothesis that this crossmodal interaction between psychology and 
physiology includes one between signified and signifier of the text. 
4. Prejudices  
It must now be noted that, despite the scope and reliability of the available empirical research, 
and despite the millenary prestige of the philosophical tradition that precedes it, the question of 
sound symbolism remains poorly tolerated in several linguistic departments, particularly in 
France. To give an idea of the extent of this, it will suffice to recall a brief anecdote going back 
to the time when we were preparing our conference.  
By the end of July 2016, Damian Blasi and his colleagues had published in the American 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences a remarkable study on sound symbolism, 
demonstrating, through a vast quantitative analysis of almost all the world's languages (6452 
languages), that the most common words in the lexicon tend to prefer similar phonemes, in 
different languages, to designate similar concepts (for example, the concepts of "red" and 
"round" tend to prefer, on a global scale, /r/, while the concepts of "bite" and "bone" tend to 
prefer /k/). At the beginning of the academic year, some of the most prestigious scientific 
journals (Nature, see Fitch 2016; Scientific American, see Pycha 2016) publish reviews praising 
the study. French radio station France culture does not escape the exercise and organises a 
programme entitled "Linguistics: languages would have many sounds in common" (16 
September). In this program, after a short interview with one of the authors of the study, the 
floor is given to two famous French linguists who, without having read the article, relying solely 
on their personal feelings and the authority of Saussure (1916) and Jakobson (1960), reassure 
the general public by claiming that this is not the case. They also admonish the public for being 
wary of "this American desire to demonstrate a unique and divine origin of language because 
we are at the limit of ideology and science". Dumbfounded, I try to point out very politely, by 
a user comment on the programme webpage, that the study was not carried out in the United 
States, but in Europe, five authors out of six coming from European universities; that it is not 
based on creationist theories, but on quantitative data of unprecedented scope, from large 
computerized corpora; that it has been published by one of the best scientific journals in the 
United States, and that it has been positively reviewed by the most influential scientific journal 
on the planet ; and finally that, if we wanted at all costs to stick to the European authors of the 
last century, we could have quoted at least Saussure's notebook on anagrams (Starobinski 1971) 
and Jakobson's (1965) article "À la recherche l'essence du langage" which give a much more 
important place to phonological iconicity than that supposed by the interviewees. 
Unfortunately, the website administrator does not consider it appropriate for me to provide these 
details and deletes my comment several times. Thus, the French public in the language sciences 
has been prohibited by authority from accessing the new achievements of the discipline.  
This episode provides an interesting insight into the mistrust that still prevails in some French 
linguistic circles regarding any possible questioning of the arbitrariness of the sign. One also 
sees, on the other hand, that this mistrust does not depend on a lack of empirical evidence in 
favour of the motivation of the sign, but on the simple perpetuation of an old epistemological 
prejudice that must now be brought to light in its structure and origins. 
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5. Naturalism 
A good starting point for analyzing the prejudice of arbitrariness is Sylvain Auroux's 
introduction "Le paradigme naturaliste" to the thematic issue of the French journal Histoire 
Epistémologie Langage that he directed and entitled Le naturalisme linguistique et ses 
désordres (29/2, 2007). The author argues that the arbitrariness of the sign should not be 
considered as just another empirical observation, but as a fundamental postulate, whose role is 
not to describe particular facts, but to establish the epistemological framework of the human 
and social sciences:  
The arbitrariness of the sign is not a proven fact, it plays the role of a principle of 
demarcation [...]. Arbitrary is not a fact, it is the theoretical principle at the origin of 
history and culture (Auroux 2007: 6-7).  
Sylvain Auroux considers arbitrariness as the theoretical device that ensures the fundamental 
separation between the world of man and the natural environment, from which derives the 
academic and disciplinary separation between the human sciences and the natural sciences. 
Indeed, when we affirm that language is based on the unmotivated relationship between 
signifier and signified, we affirm that it is the place of an original and impassable separation 
between body and mind, the res extensa and res cogitans, the physiology and psychology of the 
human being. Thus, on the one hand, there would be the physiological experience of the sounds 
of language, which would be part of the sensory-motor functioning of the body and would obey 
the physical laws of nature, and on the other hand, the psychological experience of meaning, 
which would belong to the cognitive functioning of the mind and which, free from natural 
constraints, would obey the moral and rational laws of culture: 
The sounds of language are also natural phenomena [...]. What makes something 
"natural" make sense? The naturalistic response is to argue that meaning is born from 
nature itself; the culturalist response proposes, on the contrary, that meaning comes 
from a specific order, foreign to nature [...]. Epigenetism [a theory proposed by S. 
Auroux] [...] can be considered as the conception of a clear demarcation between 
nature and culture and, consequently, of the autonomy of the social sciences (Auroux 
2007: 8-10). 
This sharp separation, making it possible to isolate a cultural sphere totally emancipated from 
nature, which the author brings back to the Enlightenment, appears to him as ethically and 
politically desirable because it would ensure the autonomy of the SHS in relation to the natural 
sciences. Unfortunately, it also leads to a dark and less desirable side, which closely resembles 
a "return of the repressed". Indeed, any questioning of this separation would entail, according 
to the author, the risk of contagion with a "naturalism" that he symmetrically conceives as being 
totally devoid of humanity, and which would have been typically embodied between the 19th 
and 20th centuries, by the emergence of racism and Nazism. 
Of course, Sylvain Auroux seems to us to be right when he argues that the centuries-old debate 
on the nature of the sign is intrinsically linked to the fundamental postulates of our civilization, 
particularly with regard to the relationship between body and mind, nature and culture, observed 
object and observer subject, reality and language, i.e. those that could be called with Benveniste 
(1939) the "metaphysical" foundations of our civilization. It is also true that this debate has 
tended to reopen periodically, throughout history, whenever these assumptions of any discourse 
were shaken and redefined, particularly because of the evolution of language technologies (we 
will come back to this later).  Even today, after all, to explore the apparently marginal question 
of sound symbolism is nothing but to explore the very possibility of a different foundation of 
our culture, defining otherwise its relationship to nature, reality and the body.  
We do not underestimate, moreover, the political and cultural risks that Auroux points out and 
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that any questioning of the foundations of a culture involves. In particular, it is undeniable that 
a certain kind of blurring of the boundary between nature and culture and a certain kind of 
linguistic naturalism may have been exploited in the past in order to support racist ideologies. 
However, we believe we can argue that today the situation is quite different, if not almost 
reversed, and that the risk factors are of a different nature. We therefore do not share Auroux's 
idea that the defence to the bitter end of the modern separation between nature and culture (and 
therefore between signifier and signified) must constitute the impassable ethical-political 
horizon of the human and social science.  
If there is one point of agreement between sociologists regarding the resurgence of racism, 
xenophobia and Nazism over the past thirty years, it is that naturalistic ideologies have become 
less and less essential within them (Balibar 1991, Jones 1999, Rodat 2017). While it cannot be 
said that racism in the narrow sense has disappeared, the emerging forms of discrimination are 
less about the colour of the skin or the shape of the nose than about the colour of the banknotes 
people have in their pockets, and the shape of the cultural and ethnic-religious worlds they have 
in their heads. Almost no one no longer believes that one race can be biologically superior or 
inferior to another, but almost everyone is convinced that a culture can be. The ideologies of 
intolerance and hatred have essentially become culturalist ideologies, which prioritize and 
discriminate against people on the basis of their origin culture and cultural level, both outside 
and within each national community. Now, if this makes the problem all the more insidious 
because it is less objectifiable and recognizable, what is at least now indisputable is that 
defending the separation between nature and culture to prevent discriminatory ideologies has 
become, in this context, completely irrelevant. 
On the other hand, a completely different issue calls for an urgent and radical redefinition of 
our culture's relationship with nature: it is the environmental and climate crisis caused by human 
activity. In this field, the idea that the human sphere can or should be considered independent 
of natural constraints is clearly part of the problem, rather than the solution. All in all, it is the 
same idea that led the economic sciences (a branch of the human and social sciences!) to ignore 
by postulate the physical constraints that the finiteness of the Earth's surface and resources 
imposes on infinite economic and demographic growth (Jancovici 2019 et 2017: 47'25" suiv.). 
The ongoing environmental apocalypse (demonstrated by the natural sciences) proves that this 
ancient assumption of modernity and economy is false: humanity is not entirely autonomous 
from nature. Ultimately, like any other living being, it is part of its own environment and must 
learn to think of itself as such if it wants to hope to preserve part of its living conditions and 
quality of life in the decades to come.  
In this context, a theory of the linguistic sign that in turn thematizes a surpassing, within itself, 
of the separation between nature and culture (i.e. between signifier and signified), will perhaps 
facilitate the task of language sciences to rethink their role in order to meet the challenges posed 
by our times. 
This possibility is part of a broader epistemological change that has already been underway for 
a long time. Thus, over the past 30 years, we have witnessed the emergence of a disciplinary 
field whose only purpose is the bodily foundations of the mind: cognitive neuroscience. Not 
only, for this field, the hypothesis of a non-arbitrary correspondence between physiology and 
psychology constitutes a fundamental postulate and, so to speak, a condition of existence but, 
within the field, the traditional separation itself between sensory-motor functions and cognitive 
functions is seriously questioned (cf. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2006). In the sub-field of 
neurolinguistics (Petersen et al. 1988, Pulvermüller 2002, Pinto and Sato 2016), this is already 
reflected in the fact that the phono-articulatory sphere can no longer be considered as belonging 
to a universe radically different from the semantic-pragmatic sphere.  
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Figure 4   Neurophysiological correlates of semantic values. Understanding action verbs involving the feet, 
hands or mouth triggers the activation of motor neurons responsible for the movement of these body parts, 
according to Hauck et al. 2004 (left) and Tettamanti et al. 2005 (right). In the middle, as a reminder, the 
expected mapping of tactile and motor functions on the cortex. These studies suggest that sensorimotor 
mapping which functions as a space for simulating motor gestures represented by the semantic signifieds of 
words is no different from that which functions as a space for executing articulatory gestures realizing the 
phonological signifiers of these same words. Signifier and signified therefore physiologically share the same 
space of cortical representation, constructed essentially in the image of the anatomical and functional 
structure of the body. 
 
For example, it is now known that an important aspect of understanding the meaning of action 
verbs, from a neurophysiological point of view, is the embodied simulation of the motor 
properties of the action they designate within the motor system of the person who is interpreting 
them (Hauck et al. 2004, Tettamanti et al. 2005; see Figure 4). Understanding the verb to pick 
is unconsciously activating the motor network of your own hands, while understanding to lick 
or to kick is activating the motor network of your tongue or feet, respectively. Now, this means 
that the semantic sphere ceases to be radically irreducible to the phono-articulatory one, because 
both share a common sensorimotor substrate, structured approximately, overall, like a body 
map. These discoveries have considerable epistemological implications, which have been partly 
theoretically represented by the emergence of concepts such as embodiment and enaction (cf. 
Varela et al. 1991, Rohrer 2007, Durt et al. 2017, Bottineau 2010 and 2013, Bottineau et 
Grégoire 2017) which precisely thematize the complexification of the once linear and 
insurmountable boundary between physiology and psychology of language. 
The recent development of research on linguistic iconicity and sound symbolism is therefore 
part of a major epistemological shift that concerns all scientific knowledge on language. It is 
no coincidence that among the most influential positions in favour of a motivated link between 
phonetics and semantics are those of leading personalities in cognitive neuroscience such as 
Rizzolatti and Craighero (2007), Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) or Gentilucci and 
Corballis (2006). Indeed, to affirm that the link between sound and meaning is at least partly 
motivated is to affirm that, in language (and in particular in the new "language" object that 
emerged in the 20th century thanks to analog oral technologies, then in the 21st century thanks 
to digital technology), the relationship between body and mind, nature and culture, physiology 
and psychology is not a relationship of radical separation that has nothing to teach us, but a 
relationship, at least in part, of contiguity, similarity, correspondence and interdependence 
whose specific forms deserve to be explored and investigated. 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
L 
 
This innovative position of the natural sciences and their tendency to cross the border with the 
human sciences does not mean that, in the context of this upheaval, influence should be 
exercised in one direction only, or that the only legitimate perspective on the motivation of the 
sign should be that of the natural sciences. Just think of the trajectory of rediscovery of human 
sciences undertaken by an internationally renowned neurophysiologist such as Vittorio Gallese 
to see this (Gallese and Lakoff 2005, Gallese and Cuccio 2015, Gallese 2017). Of course, no 
humanist perspective on the motivation of the sign and on the continuity of nature and culture 
can emerge without a serious and thorough consideration of the new empirical data available 
and without a courageous questioning of consolidated but limited habits of thought, such as the 
prejudice of the arbitrariness of the sign. Nevertheless, the place for such a perspective is 
already defined as the one that must restore the creative power of the speaking subject, and 
consequently the ethical and political stakes that this power entails, in relation to the status of 
an object to which the natural sciences tend constitutively to reduce him. 
It will not be pointless to recall in this context that within the ancient Stoic organisation of 
knowledge the theory of natural values of the speech sounds did not appear in the field of 
physics, nor in that of rhetoric, but in the field of ethics (Belardi 2002: II, 338-359). This was 
probably due to the fact that ethical behaviour appeared to the Greeks as behaviour in 
accordance with natural laws and that the natural values of the sounds of language functioned 
in their opinion as reminders of these laws. What would such an "ethical" issue of sign 
motivation look like today, questioning not only what the sign is (or is supposed to be), but also 
the ways and purposes in which it is (or could be) used?  
This is not a question that we can hope to answer exhaustively here. It seems to us, however, 
that it is similar to the type of questions that Edgard Morin (1997) taught us to ask about the 
poetry of life, as a horizon of ultimate meaning, in his opinion, of human existence. To give an 
important place to the motivation of the sign, alongside arbitrariness, would be, in this sense, 
to give a place to the poetic and poietic power of language, alongside its prosaic and 
representative power. And this at a time when the population of the Earth, largely illiterate, is 
gaining widespread access to public discourse through digital technologies that have as a 
distinctive feature the hybridization of the traditional prerogatives of oral and written language. 
To take seriously into account the poetic and poietic power of language would therefore be to 
ask the question of the type of world we make when speaking (and the kind we could make 
when speaking differently).  
On the other hand, to question the modern separation between nature and culture as it appears 
at the heart of the cultural sphere, i.e. in the linguistic domain, is to give an epistemologically 
adequate response, it seems to us, to the current environmental crisis. To face this crisis, it is 
urgent to rebuild a representation of the human being that is able to go beyond the antinomic 
opposition with the natural world. But this begins by recognizing and highlighting what, at the 
very heart of human culture, that is, in our ability to speak, is partly natural: what brings us 
closer to other animals and makes us full members of the living world (cf. on this point Descola 
2005 and 2017, from a slightly different perspective).  
6. Writing  
We do not go beyond an outdated conception by opposing it head-on, but by assigning it an 
honourable place within a new framework that includes and exceeds it. For example, Newtonian 
physics was not surpassed by condemning it as erroneous, but by making it a special case of 
general relativity, admissible only for certain scales of magnitude. What would therefore be the 
role to be attributed to the arbitrariness of the sign, within a linguistic theory that emphasizes 
the motivation of the relationship between signifier and signified, in order to account for both 
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its centuries-old success and its current crisis? 
We believe that arbitrariness can appear as the central and all-embracing property of language 
only if the pragmatic and cognitive experience of alphabetic writing is implicitly assumed as 
the prototypical experience of language in general. This seems to us to have happened for the 
first time with Aristotle (On Interpretation 16a), one of the first collectors of volumes in our 
tradition and the first philosopher who systematically builds his thoughts in writing, by 
discussing his 'bibliography'. The perspective he establishes, and the theory of meaning that 
accompanies it, were then endorsed and placed at the basis of the European cultural and 
educational system by Thomas Aquinas (Summa theologica, P1Q13A1).  Later, in the age of 
printing, the theory of arbitrariness reached its modern formulation, characterized by a 
progressive radicalization and generalization of its scope, from the relationship between 
signifier and signified, to the relationship between signified and reality (Descartes 1664: 1-6; 
Locke 1690: III, §2; Saussure 1916). Saussure is on the threshold of this tradition: on the one 
hand, its chapter on the nature of the sign (I,1) is presented as a retrospective synthesis, faithful 
to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the arbitrariness of the relationship between signifier 
and signified; on the other hand, its chapter on linguistic value (II, 4) proposes such a 
radicalisation and generalisation of the lockian concept of arbitrariness between signified and 
reality (no longer thought of as a specific property of a particular class of ideas, those of mixed 
modes, but as a property of language in general), that he opens the way to a perspective for 
surpassing traditional arbitrariness, immediately seized, among others, by Emile Benveniste 
(1939).     
Indeed, if the signified (the linguistic meaning) is arbitrary in relation to the reality it 
discriminates and categorizes, and if the signifier (the linguistic sound) designates this signified 
and not reality itself, then the main traditional argument in favour of the arbitrariness of the 
relationship between signifier and signified evaporates: one can no longer assert, as Aristotle 
and Locke did, that the arbitrariness of the sign is demonstrated by the fact that different 
languages use different signifiers to designate the same meanings. On the contrary, it must be 
recognized that the differences in signifier between languages generally also include differences 
in signified and that these different meanings may be represented by different sounds in 
different motivated manners, without this leading to a logical contradiction. For example (to 
take Saussure's one), if the French word mouton does not mean the same thing as English sheep, 
because the former also includes cooked meat and not the latter, then we can no longer say that 
the different phonological signifiers /mutõ/ and /ʃi:p/ demonstrate by themselves their arbitrary 
relationship with the identical semantic reality they designate. On the contrary, we are obliged 
to affirm that these two signifiers designate two different meanings and that these two different 
meanings can well be designated in a relatively motivated way by two different signifiers like 
/mutõ/ and /ʃi:p/, each with respect to the system of its language. This type of reflection, which 
significantly accompanies, in Benveniste (1939), the progressive awareness of the centrality of 
the oral utterance act, will lead to Jakobson (1965)'s first explicit formulation of a theory of 
diagrammatic iconicity. 
Throughout the time that separates Aristotle from Saussure and Jakobson, that is, during  the 
history of Western thought, alphabetic writing has been the fundamental shared experience on 
which the learned representation of language has been built. Our hypothesis is that the 
pragmatic-cognitive experience of writing have functioned throughout history as the matrix of 
the metaphysical relationship between language and reality that has generally been presupposed 
by Western culture, a relationship whose theory of the arbitrariness of the sign has only been a 
reflection in the field of language studies (cf. Nobile 2019). 
This hypothesis is part of a long tradition of theories about the influence of writing on thought, 
which ultimately goes back to the very origin of Western written thought (Plato, Phædre), when 
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the new perspective began to take shape, and which was then renewed in several forms in the 
20th century (Vigotsky 1934, Whorf 1941, McLuhan 1962, Goody and Watt 1963, Havelock 
1977, Ong 1983, etc.), when the emergence of speech technologies triggered a new 
transformation of these 'metaphysical foundations', pushing minds to reconsider the origin of 
their practices. Most of the language philosophy of 20th century, from Wittgenstein to 
Heidegger and up to Austin and Searle, would be unthinkable without the progressive 
objectification of orality, made possible first by the gramophone, telephone and radio, then by 
cinema, television and audiovisual media, even if this triggering rôle of speech technologies 
often remained implicit before McLuhan's work (1962). 
To understand within its limits and in its core of truth the idea that writing can directly influence 
the metaphysical foundations of the relationship between language and reality, and thus the 
organization of thought as a whole, it is necessary to consider writing, not only as an object or 
a means, but also as a use (Agamben 2015), i.e. as a habitual practice that has an immediate 
effect on the behaviour and subjectivation of those who adopt it, by placing them (by the very 
fact of adopting it) in a constellation of gestures, perceptions and beliefs that guide their vision 
of the world. 
The traditional experience of written language (let us leave aside digital writing for the moment) 
is intrinsically characterized by an objectification of language, that is, by its transformation into 
a silent and persistent signifying object, separated from its natural sound, and permanently 
existing before our eyes. This external, persistent and silent object, produced by the hands and 
perceived by the eyes, is used by a writer to communicate with a reader who is typically 
elsewhere and in another time, and to refer to a sensitive and pragmatic reality that is also 
usually absent from the place and time in which the text is written or read. These three 
separations between sound and the meaning it conveys, the writer and the reader to whom it is 
addressed, the act of enunciation and the reality represented in the statement are technically 
necessary for the use of writing and are constituent characteristics of the ontological 
relationship that alphabetic written cultures presuppose between language and the world: they 
define metaphysically, in an implicit and binding way, what is usually understood by "language" 
and "reality" within these cultures. Ultimately, these separations depend on the fact that, unlike 
oral speech, reading and writing are not natural and spontaneous gestures for us, but they are 
culturally acquired with some difficulty and require some effort from our sensory-motor and 
cognitive apparatus, so that we cannot perform them easily while we participate in real life 
actions with others. For example, we can't write a travel story while we're driving on the 
highway, or read a tennis story while we're playing a doubles match, while we can easily talk 
about it. Reading and writing is so cognitively expensive for us, that we generally need to stop 
all other activities and separate ourselves from the rest of the world so that we can do nothing 
but read or write.  
Written language is therefore a persistent, silent and external object, which necessarily requires 
an ontological separation between sound and meaning, the writer and the reader, the text and 
the reality of the actions to which it refers. The first important consequence of this fundamental 
ontological structure is that written language needs first and foremost to represent the absent 
reality of which it speaks. The second is that it cannot be adjusted in real time to the changes it 
produces in the speaker and in reality itself while it is talking about it and, consequently, it 
cannot produce and guide these changes in a fine and controlled way. In other words, written 
language is a language where constativity tends to predominate over performativity. This also 
means that, from the point of view of a culture based on written objectified language, what is 
called "reality" tends in turn to appear as an objective entity, i.e. as a set of persistent objects 
whose existence and properties do not depend on the fact that one talks about them. By the way, 
this is the ontological condition so that linguistic statements about reality can be preserved and 
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accumulated over time, and so that there can be something like a History, a Philosophy and a 
Science. 
7. Orality 
The traditional oral experience of language (let's leave aside again, for now, technological oral) 
is quite different. Oral language is not a silent and persistent object placed by the hands in front 
of the eyes, but a noisy ephemeral event, generated by the mouth all around the body, and 
especially around the ears. As a phonetic event, oral language has an ontological structure very 
different from that of a written object: it is made of energy waves rather than material particles; 
it has a temporal and cyclic extension (syllabation, breathing, speech turn) rather than a spatial 
and linear one; it is a cyclic modification of the energetic state and spatial relationships between 
the material particles of air rather than a new persistent material structure adding to the existing 
matter. Now, this noisy, ephemeral, transformative event, made of cyclic energy waves that 
shake the environment, is not addressed to an absent reader, but to a present interlocutor, and 
does not necessarily refer to an absent reality, but it can also refer (and usually refers) to the 
present sensitive and pragmatic reality. It is therefore a noisy action, performed in front of a 
noisy interlocutor, in the middle of noisy actions, to which it refers. Moreover, since the 
interlocutor and the reality of the concerned events are present, speech does not limit itself to 
addressing the former to represent the latter, but it can also (and typically does) perform speech 
acts that immediately change the interlocutor's behaviour and the course of events, changes that 
can in turn change the speech that is producing them, recursively. Thus, if written language is 
typically a silent object that objectively describes to an absent reader an absent reality made of 
silent objects existing independently of the fact that one is speaking of them, oral language, on 
the contrary, is a noisy event that dynamically influences a speaker interacting with it and 
changes a reality made of noisy events, that can be changed by the fact that one speaks of them 
and which in turn can change the speech that is changing them. Unlike written speech, therefore, 
oral speech is not completely separated from the reality of which it speaks: rather, it is a part of 
the latter, which can modify the whole and can be modified by it, within a recursive loop of 
transformation and creation where the performative power of language tends to predominate 
over its constative power. 
These pragmatic-cognitive differences between the experience of writing and that of speaking 
lead to several lexical and grammatical differences (what is known as the diamesic variation of 
language). For example, the written word is characterized by a higher rate of nouns, third-
person pronouns and declarative sentences (means used to represent absent reality), while the 
spoken word is characterized by a relatively higher rate of deictics, first and second person 
pronouns, and interrogative and injunctive sentences (means that allow it to influence the course 
of events). Among these differences, one of the least studied is the status of sound symbolism: 
it is relatively marginal in the written word and in written cultures, but becomes more important 
when oral cultures, less literate social groups or oral varieties of written languages are taken 
into account.  
There are several arguments for such a link between the importance of oral language within a 
culture and the importance of phonological iconicity within that language. We know, for 
example, that in English the iconicity rate in the lexicon (defined as the statistical correlation 
between the phonetic similarity of the words and their semantic similarity) is negatively 
correlated with the age of word acquisition: iconicity is more frequent among words learned 
orally before the age of 6 than in words learned in school, when literacy triggers the 
development of the bookish lexicon, less iconic (see Figure 5); this suggests, among other 
things, that iconicity could play a certain biological-cognitive role in facilitating language 
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acquisition (Monaghan et al. 2014; Perry et al. 2015; Massaro and Perlman 2017; and see 
already Koenig and Fischer 1980).  
 
 
 
Figure 5   Systematicity (or diagrammatic iconicity) rate as a function of the age of acquisition of the English 
monosyllabic lexicon, according to Monaghan et al. (2014) 
 
Second, it can be seen that primary oral cultures such as those of most Nigerian-Congolese, 
Aboriginal and Amerindian languages tend to assign a greater communicative and performative 
role to ideophones and other phonosymbolic words than most languages belonging to 
agricultural and scriptural civilizations; in addition, among the latter, those who have 
experienced more recent sedentarisation and literacy, such as Korean, Japanese and Turkish 
cultures, tend to have more important ideophone repertoires than the older Sino-Tibetan, Indo-
European and Afro-Asian agricultural and scriptural civilizations. Third, in cultures where 
ideophones play a notoriously important communicative role, such as in Japanese, Basque or 
Zulu, these sound symbolic forms typically characterise oral, familiar, informal and rural 
varieties of the language more than written, careful, formal or urban varieties; for example, 
Swahili, the main lingua franca of black Africa, is one of the Nigerian-Congolese languages 
with the fewest ideophones (Childs 1994). 
These three orders of fact therefore converge to suggest that sound symbolism mainly 
characterizes the natural oral form of language and tends to disappear into its written form.   
This special relationship between sound symbolism and orality is not difficult to explain in the 
light of the previous analysis. First of all, form a perceptual point of view, hearing linguistic 
sounds is obviously essential to be able to appreciate their sound symbolism and this is better 
guaranteed orally than in writing. Secondly, from a bio-semiotic point of view, we have pointed 
out that oral language is a noisy event occurring in the midst of the noisy events to which it 
refers: it is therefore more likely that it 'resonates' with them, and that this resonance makes 
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sense and assumes a function in the speech. In general, for example, an oral speech, to be 
appropriate, must harmonize with the rhythm, duration and sound intensity of the events in 
which it is part; if it harmonizes also with the dominant frequencies and timbres of these events, 
sound symbolism emerges. In contrast, we have characterized written language as a silent object 
that refers to an absent and therefore silent reality: it cannot therefore easily resonate with it 
(with the exception of poetic language which is, after all, a wreck of archaic oral cultures within 
the written tradition: see below). Third, from a pragmatic point of view, we have suggested that 
oral language tends to be, overall, more performative and less constative than written language, 
precisely because of its presence in the face of the events it speaks of, which it does not need to 
represent so much as to guide, so that expressive effectiveness is more important to it than 
denotative accuracy; now, sound symbolism is an excellent factor of expressiveness, and a 
mediocre factor of accuracy. Fourthly, from a socio-anthropological point of view, oral language 
is used more, on average, by ordinary people, which, historically (in the long history of 
language formation), means mainly by farmers, shepherds and hunter-gatherers living in 
contact with nature and animals, whose wide variety of sounds and voices has only encouraged 
the implementation of the imitative capacities inherent in the human articulated voice (imitative 
capacities absent in most terrestrial mammals, and comparable only to those of a few bird 
species). On the contrary, written language was more often used, on average, by socio-cultural 
elites with the time to learn and use it, thanks to the fact that others worked the land and raised 
animals in their place, elites who therefore lived more frequently in places farther from animals 
and their sounds (e. g. in cities or palaces), and in any case in a less constraining existential 
relationship with other forms of life and their sound productions. Fifth, from a cognitive point 
of view, unlike written cultures, oral cultures generally have a problem of data memorization: 
they usually solve it through poetry and song, where sound symbolism and diagrammatic 
iconicity play a decisive role in establishing and saving the connection between names and 
referents, as well as between their conceptual constellations. For example, the great 
ethnozoological lexical repertoires of Amazonian oral cultures (studied by Berlin 1994) are 
often organized sound-symbolically.    
Finally, from the point of view of the history of ideas, this special relationship of sound 
symbolism with orality explains well why its treatment represented such a crucial question at 
the beginning of different written traditions, and in particular of the alphabetical tradition, to 
the point that the first work on philosophy of language that has reached us, Plato's Cratylus, is 
largely devoted to it (cf. Dalimier 1998). In our opinion, this centrality of sound symbolism in 
Plato is due to the fact that it represents the main gap between the traditional poetic-oracular 
sapience on language, which Plato deeply respects, and the new empiric rational perspective of 
written philosophy, which he is founding. For him, therefore, sound symbolism is the main 
problem to be addressed if he wants to integrate the old linguistic knowledge of the oral tradition 
into the new alphabetical format of his philosophy (see Nobile and Lombardi Vallauri 2016: 
23-33 on this point). 
8. Scholars 
The original link of sound symbolism with orality, childhood, oral cultures and illiteracy, which 
we have tried to illustrate in the previous chapters, explains well why, in the history of thought, 
this phenomenon may have been the subject of a haughty and contemptuous refusal on the part 
of scholars, who have sometimes treated it as the very prototype of a popular, anti-scientific 
and irrational belief, unworthy of appearing in the writings of well-educated people, that is, 
educated in the framework of the written culture. In this respect, it will suffice to recall the 
welcome that some members of the Académie française gave in 1913 to one of the last authors 
of a mystical theory of sound symbolism, Jean-Pierre Brisset, by flouting him in front of the 
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crowd with the sarcastic title of "Prince of Thinkers" (Decimo 2001).  
This aversion of scholars reflects a very justified fear, because sound symbolism is a clear 
indicator of the bias of their written culture and its inadequacy as a modeling device for 
language in general. This fear is particularly obsessive for linguists because, on the one hand, 
they cannot ignore the indisputable ontogenetic and phylogenetic primacy of oral speech and, 
on the other hand, they can only build themselves as language professionals on the basis of the 
objectifying separation, ensured by writing, between (written) language and reality, with the 
particularity that in their case the reality which is the subject of their (written) speech is in turn 
represented by (written) language. In other words, any influential linguist, to become one, must 
devote much more time to reading and writing than the general population. As much as possible, 
he must tear himself away from the cognitive universe of orality to immerse himself in the 
world of writing until he makes it his own natural environment. He must write and publish as 
many texts as possible demonstrating that he knows how to use his linguistic tool in a 
descriptive and non-expressive way to move his target language away from himself until it 
becomes a real object of thought. In addition, he must be able to support his statements with 
written attestations, whether primary (examples, corpora) or secondary (bibliographic sources). 
In this process, which is both scientific and existential, the pragmatic-cognitive characteristics 
of orality often end up falling into the background when they are not simply suppressed from 
the linguist's introspective consciousness.  
The linguist thus builds his socio-professional status as a language expert at the cost of a 
necessary and fundamental distancing from the common experience of spoken language. Now, 
the latter is often characterised by the perception of a certain motivation of the relationship 
between signifier and signified, especially among the less educated. The rejection of sound 
symbolism thus becomes the point of honour on which the linguist hopes to assert the 
superiority of his "objective" view in the face of the "subjective" beliefs of the majority of the 
population (see already Benveniste 1939 on this point). But the same cognitive process that 
ensures the objectivity of his gaze always risks depriving him of something so precious: the 
awareness of the partial and atypical nature of his own experience of language, precisely as a 
linguist. Now, to the extent that his judgments are often influenced by introspective approaches 
(or at best by the analysis of written corpora), it is legitimate to hypothesize that his tendency 
to overgeneralize the scope of the arbitrariness of the sign reflects a biased language experience 
in which writing prevails over orality and conceals its prerogatives.  
It is sufficient, by the way, to take up the Course in General Linguistics again to see that the 
concept of "langue" which is its object, and of which arbitrariness constitutes the fundamental 
property, is exhaustively defined by its written traces. The proof that langue exists 
independently of speech, Saussure tells us, is its existence in the form of dead languages, 
grammars and dictionaries, that is writings (Saussure 1916: 31-32). It is interesting to note, 
moreover, that at the other end of the history, when Aristotle first formulated the concept of 
arbitrariness, the comparison with writing also enters into his definition:  
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the 
symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have 
not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly 
symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are 
the images (De interpretatione, 16a; Edghill's translation).  
This implicit adoption of written language as a tool for modelling language in general has its 
predictable counterparts, both in Saussure and Aristotle, in the separation between sound and 
meaning and in the centrality of the constative speech act, which Aristotle himself is the first to 
conceptualize and distinguish from the performative by calling it "apophantic speech".  
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Overall, the history of thought, as a history, and therefore as a fact of writing, is the history of 
the predominance of the arbitrariness of the sign. Yet it is far from representing the entire human 
experience of language because writing and history, however prestigious they may be, have 
never represented anything more than the experience of a learned minority. At least, until today.  
9. Digital  
If we have been able to trace the above synthesis proposing an external view of the whole of 
Western written tradition and the particular relationship it establishes between language and 
reality, it is because we are now, if not outside this tradition, at least on its final threshold. The 
ongoing technological revolution, by completing a transformation that began at the end of the 
19th century, has not only shaken the millenary divide that separated and hierarchized orality 
and writing, but has created for the first time a common, flexible and configurable medium for 
these two forms of expression. On the one hand, the digital medium promotes interoperability 
and hybridization between orality and writing and, on the other hand, it allows a fine 
configuration of their uses, i.e. of what we thought we could describe as the material 
foundations of the 'metaphysical' relationship between language and reality in our culture. 
These foundations, which until now appeared to us as a reflection of certain physical constraints 
imposed on different language practices, are now increasingly becoming the product of a 
deliberate human project, that is, of a computer-based programming of the forms of oral and 
written language interaction in the society. 
If our hypothesis is correct and if the centrality of the separation between signifier and signified, 
body and mind, physiology and psychology of language, within our culture, is a reflection of 
the pragmatic-cognitive experience of paper-based alphabetic writing, then this separation can 
only be challenged and profoundly redefined by the transformations that language technologies 
have introduced into the social treatment of language. These transformations have led to both a 
colossal democratization of the reading and writing experience, and the progressive 
marginalization of its traditional form compared to analog audiovisual, and then to its technical 
and functional hybridization with the new forms of digital orality, within the multimedia and 
interactive online space. 
While writing on paper has now lost the centrality it had at the beginning of the 20th century 
(and for the previous 5000 years), online mass interactive digital writing is now acquiring new 
properties, previously typical of oral communication, such as instantaneity, dialogicity, 
multimedia, modifiability, proxemical contextuality (thanks to smartphones) and even 
evanescence (in the case of self-destructive SnapChat messages, for example). Conversely, 
online mass digital audiovisual oral communication can today enjoy features that were once 
typical of writing, such as persistence, archivability, reproducibility, asynchronity, 
unidirectionality, spatial transferability and traceability. Even if some of these characteristics 
had already surfaced in the analog audiovisual sector, it is only with digital technology that they 
have a daily impact on the active and passive uses of language by most of the population. As a 
result, the two modes of expression now converge, in the common experience, towards 
increasingly complete interoperability: we can publish a blog post or a live video streaming, 
perform a keyboard or voice command search, dictate a text on our phone or have one read by 
a synthetic voice. Thus, the gap between oral and written language is tempered both in its 
pragmatic forms and pragmatic functions (as well as obviously in its grammatical forms and 
functions). Given that on a global scale, truly literate users remain a minority, it is likely that 
this hybridizing interoperability between orality and writing will benefit mainly to orality, and 
that it will soon become the most important modality for digitally mediated language 
interaction. 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
LVIII 
 
From the point of view of the epistemology of language sciences, this relative return to power 
of technologically equipped orality cannot, of course, lead to a pure and simple return to the 
archaic poetic-oracular perspectives on sound symbolism, represented for example in Plato's 
Cratylus as the legacy of a prephilosophical oral culture (that of Heraclitus, Homer and 
Orpheus). Between these ancestral visions and the one emerging today there is about the same 
ontological distance as between a face-to-face oral conversation and a live streaming 
videoconference with an integrated interactive chat. Nevertheless, the technological 
transformations underway will undoubtedly undermine the purely scriptural perspective 
sketched by Saussure at the beginning of the 20th century and will necessarily involve the return 
of a number of properties of the archaic sound symbolic visions of language, just as a live 
streaming with integrated chat undeniably shares a number of formal characteristics with oral 
face-to-face conversation. This is, after all, only an epistemological corollary of Jean-François 
Lyotard's famous thesis (1979) on the postmodern condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Relative frequency of the terms pragmatique (blue line), énonciation (red), syntaxe (green), 
morphologie (orange) and phonologie (violet) in French books between 1900 and 2008 according to Google 
N-Gram Viewer. Pragmatique and énonciation became the most frequent from the 1975-1985 decade 
onwards, simultaneously with the spread of the analog audiovisual media. 
 
This return of archaic features in the epistemology of language sciences is already evident in 
the hegemony that pragmatics and theories of the utterance act have exercised over the rest of 
the field for half a century (see Figure 6), and in the undeniable proximity between some of 
their founding themes (How to do things with words, Austin 1962) and some traditional 
problems of magic (magical formulas like abracadabra were precisely supposed to "do things 
with words"). This is also the profound meaning of Giorgio Agamben's famous thesis, in our 
opinion, according to which the field of modern pragmatics correspond exactly to that of ancient 
metaphysics (1982: 36). This correspondence is also well perceived by French editors of 
children's books, who often present the learning of the first illocutionary acts (sorry, thank you, 
please) as that of the new 'magic words'. 
It must be stressed, however, that in absolute terms, the most salient feature of digital media is 
neither a return to orality nor a generalization of writing, but the confluence of these two forms 
of expression in a single digital medium which, by adapting them to its own constraints and 
potential, determines their hybridization. If, on the one hand, this tends to temper the traditional 
sociolinguistic hierarchy between writing and orality (because today's blog-writer no longer 
enjoys a more prestigious position than that of the video-speaker), on the other hand, it brings 
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about a whole new level of sociolinguistic hierarchy, represented by the technical mastering of 
the computer code that shapes the structure of the underlying support, shared by digital orality 
and writing. 
From a semiotic point of view, computer programming is a form of writing that is perfectly 
separated from oral language, since it can be reduced to logico-mathematical meanings only 
and purified of any connection with the phonological signifier. However, from a pragmatic point 
of view, it is also a writing that is perfectly hybridised with the modalities of orality, insofar as, 
unlike traditional writing, it never serves to describe realities that exist independently of the fact 
that it talks about them, but it always serves to create them by the very fact of 'speaking' of 
them. In other words, like the Creator Word of origins, coding says nothing but what it does.  
Now, what it does, in terms of language, is to organize the general way of functioning and the 
particular functionalities of the space within which oral and written language interactions 
between individuals occur. In other words, computer coding is the metadiscourse that defines 
the conditions of existence and operational details of any digitally mediated language use. But 
if, as we have tried to demonstrate, these uses constitute the material foundations of the 
metaphysical presuppositions of any cultural universe, then the specificity of the present 
cultural universe is that its metaphysical presuppositions are no longer really presupposed, but 
they are now deliberately posed by human work (although still partly unconsciously). Human 
culture ceases to consist primarily of talking about reality and increasingly becomes a 
permanent process of redefining what "talking" and "reality" mean. The forms in which the 
GAFAs (and possibly States) will inscribe human language interactions will immediately 
determine (whether they want it or not) the types of relationship between language and reality 
that these interactions will presuppose and therefore the types of cultural universes to which 
they will give rise. The recent re-emergence of mythical universes based on the equivalence 
between news and fake news, social theory and conspiracy theories, empirical evidence and 
deepfake is only a foretaste of what we will face in the coming years.  
The possibility of reprogramming by ICTs the pragmatic conditions of our linguistic uses is the 
exact equivalent, from a cognitive and collective point of view, of what the reprogramming of 
DNA with CRISPR technology represents from an anatomical and individual point of view. 
With only one difference, that in the second case we have a much better mastery of the technique 
and are all in all more aware of the risks it entails. 
A theory of the linguistic sign adequate for our time can only take into account the emerging 
hybridization between arbitrariness and motivation, and between constative and performative 
uses of language. Just as quantum computing is preparing to surpass the binary logic of the bit 
to go toward the hybrid and probabilistic logic of the qubit, in the same way, a theory of the 
linguistic sign at the level of the present challenges will have to consider, alongside the 
traditional cases of arbitrary and naturally motivated signs, a new family of potentially 
predominant phenomena. These are cases where, as a result of the radical arbitrariness of the 
sign, it is possible to identify differential networks of sound symbolically motivated signs 
characteristic of each language. Indeed, each language carries a different semantic 
interpretation of reality, which can be seen both as a representation and as a creation of the latter 
(see Figure 7). Now, sound symbolic signifiers can also both imitate certain properties of reality 
and contribute to semantically highlighting them, and this in different ways in the different 
languages. This class of phenomena represents in the end only a generalization of criteria 
already used today in the identification of phonesthemes and submorphemes. In it, we observe 
neither a naturalistic and universal association between an individual sound and a concept, nor 
an arbitrary convention uniting a signifier and a signified, but a system of motivated differences 
between signifiers, which represents or generates phonosymbolically a system of differences 
between the signified cognitively codified by a language (see Nobile 2011, 2014a, 2014b). 
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Figure 7 The image suggests how a single referential reality (the 12 dots shown in the central figure) can 
receive different relevant semantic interpretations (the four "triangles" on the left or the three "squares" 
on the right), and how these different interpretations can be considered both as representations of primary 
reality and as creations of secondary realities. A sound symbolic signifier can imitate the sensory properties 
of primary reality as well as help to shape those of secondary reality, in differently motivated ways within 
different languages. 
 
This type of perspective, which resolutely goes beyond the traditional metaphysical divide 
between nature and culture, may make it possible to redefine criteria to guide oneself in the 
proliferation of uses and universes that digital technology will continue to nourish. In particular, 
it will be a question of understanding which of these innumerable devices of representation and 
creation of reality will make it easier for individuals to rebuild around them, by speaking, 
poetically habitable worlds.   
 
 
Bibliography 
ABELIN, Åsa (1999). Studies in sound symbolism [thesis], Göteborg, Göteborg University. 
ABRAMOVA, Ekatrina and FERNÁNDEZ, Raquel (2016). “Questioning Arbitrariness in 
Language: a Data-Driven Study of Conventional Iconicity”, Proceedings of NAACL-HLT, 343–
352. 
AGAMBEN, Giorgio (1982). Il linguaggio e la morte, Torino, Einaudi. 
AGAMBEN, Giorgio (2015). L'uso dei corpi, Vicenza, Neri Pozza. 
AKITA, Kimi (2009). A grammar of sound-symbolic words in Japanese [thesis], Tokyo, Kobe 
University. 
AKITA, Kimi (2011). "Toward a phonosemantic definition of iconic words", Michelucci et al. 
2011: 3-18. 
AKITA, Kimi (2012). "Toward a frame-semantic definition of sound-symbolic words: A 
collocational analysis of Japanese mimetics", Cognitive Linguistics 23(1). 67-90.  
AKITA, Kimi and PARDESHI, Prashant (2019). Ideophones, Mimetics and Expressives, 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
LXI 
 
ANDLER, Daniel (2016). La silhouette de l'humain : quelle place pour le naturalisme dans le 
monde d'aujourd'hui ?, Paris : Gallimard. 
ASTON, William (1894). "Japanese onomatopes and the origin of language", Journal of the 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 23, 332-362. 
AUROUX, Sylvain (2007). "Introduction: le paradigme naturaliste", Histoire Epistémologie 
Langage, 29(2). 5-15. 
BALIBAR, Étienne (1991). "Is there a Neo-Racism?", Étienne BALIBAR and I. Wallerstein (eds.). 
Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso, 17-28. 
BERGEN, Benjamin (2004). "The psychological reality of phonaesthemes", Language 80(2). 
290-311. 
BENVENISTE, Émile (1939). "Nature du signe linguistique", Acta linguistica 1, 23-29. 
BELARDI, Walter (2002). L'etimologia nella storia della cultura occidentale, Rome: Calamo. 
BERLIN, Brent (1994). "Evidence for pervasive synestethic sound symbolism in ethnozoological 
nomenclature", in Hinton et al. 1994: 76-93. 
BLASI, Damián, WICHMANN, Søren, HAMMARSTRÖM, Harald, STADLER, Peter and 
CHRISTIANSEN, Morten (2016). "Sound–meaning association biases evidenced across 
thousands of languages", PNAS, 113(39). 10818-10823. 
BLOOMFIELD, Leonard (1933). Language, New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 
BLUST, Robert (2003). "The Phonestheme ŋ- in Austronesian Languages", Oceanic Linguistics, 
42(1). 187-212. 
BOHAS, George et DAT, Florin-Mihai (2007). Une théorie de l'organisation du lexique des 
langues sémitiques: matrices et étymon, Lyon : ENS Editions. 
BÖHME, Jakob (1635). De signatura rerum, Amsterdam: Janssonius. 
BOTTINEAU, Didier (2008). "The submorphemic conjecture in English: towards a distributed 
model of the cognitive dynamics of submorphemes", Lexis 2, 17-38. 
BOTTINEAU, Didier (2010). "Language and enaction", J. STEWART, O. GAPENNE et E. DI PAOLO 
(éds). Enaction : toward a new paradigm for cognitive science, Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press, 267-306. 
BOTTINEAU, Didier (2013). "Pour une approche enactive de la parole dans les langues", 
Langages 192(4). 11-27. 
BOTTINEAU, Didier and GREGOIRE, Michaël (2017). "Le langage humain, les langues et la 
parole du point de vue du languaging et de l’énaction", Intellectica 68, 7-18. 
BOWLES, Hugo (1995). "The semantic properties of the phonaestheme", Studi Italiani di 
Linguistica Teorica e Applicata 24(1). 91-106. 
BOWLES, Hugo (1998). "The phonetic structure of the phonaestheme", Studi Italiani di 
Linguistica Teorica e Applicata 27(2). 351-368. 
BROSSES, Charles de (1765). Traité de la formation méchanique des langues et des principes 
physiques de l'étymologie, Paris, Saillant 
CESAROTTI Melchiorre (1785). Saggio sopra la lingua italiana, Padoue, Penada 
CHASTAING, Maxime (1958). "Le symbolisme des voyelles: significations des i", Journal de 
psychologie normale et pathologique 51(3). 403-423 and 461-481. 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
LXII 
 
CHASTAING, Maxime (1962). " La brillance des voyelles", Archivium Linguisticum 14(1). 1 13. 
CHASTAING, Maxime (1964). "L'opposition des consonnes 'sourdes' aux consonnes 'sonores' a-
t-elle une valeur symbolique?", Vie et langage 147, 367-370. 
CHASTAING, Maxime (1966). "Si les R étaient des L...", Vie et langage 159, 311-317. 
CHAVEE, Honoré (1849). Lexiologie indo-européenne ou Essai sur la science des mots, Paris-
Leipzig, Franck. 
CHILDS, G. Tucker (1994). "African ideophones", in HINTON et al. 1994: 178-204. 
CRISINEL, Anne-Sylvie, JONES, Sophie and SPENCE, Charles (2012) « “The Sweet Taste of 
Maluma”: Crossmodal Associations Between Tastes and Words ». Chemosensory Perception 
5, 266-273. 
DALIMIER, Catherine (1998). "Introduction", Platon, Cratyle, Paris: Flammarion, 11-60. 
DAVIS, R. (1961) "The fitness of names to drawings: a cross-cultural study in Tanganyika", 
British Journal of Psychology 52, 259-268. 
DECIMO, Marc (2001). Jean-Pierre Brisset - Prince des penseurs, inventeur, grammairien et 
prophète, Dijon, Les presses du réel. 
DESCARTES, Réné (1664). Le monde ou le Traité de la lumière, Paris, Bobin et Le Gras. 
DESCOLA, Philippe (2005). Par-delà nature et culture, Paris, Gallimard. 
DESCOLA, Philippe (2017). Penser la nature à l'heure de l'anthropocène [videoconference], 
Marseille, MuCem <youtu.be/6l9Bfm6rEOc>, visited on 30.4.2019.  
DIFFLOTH, Gérard (1972). "Notes on expressive meaning", Papers of the Chicago Linguistic 
Society 8, 440-447. 
DINGEMANSE, Mark (2011). The Meaning and Use of Ideophones in Siwu [thesis], Nijmegen, 
Universiteit Nijmegen. 
DINGEMANSE, Mark (2012). "Advances in the Cross-Linguistic Study of Ideophones", 
Language and Linguistics Compass 6(10), 654-672. 
DINGEMANSE, Mark (2018). "Redrawing the margins of language: Lessons from research on 
ideophones", Glossa: a journal of general linguistics 3/4, 1-30. 
DOKE, Clement Martyn (1935). Bantu linguistic terminology, Londres : Longmans and Green. 
DURT, Christoph,  FUCHS, Thomas and TEWES, Christian, éds (2017). Embodiment, Enaction, 
and Culture. Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World, Cambridge (MA). MIT Press. 
FIRTH, John Rupert (1930). Speech, London, Ernest Benn. 
FITCH, William Tecumseh (2016). "Sound and meaning in the world’s languages", Nature 539, 
39-40. 
FOX, Charles Warren (1935). « An experimental study of naming », The american journal of 
psychology, 47(4), 545-579. 
GABELENTZ, Georg von der (1891). Die Sprachwissenschaft, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1901. 
GALLESE, Vittorio (2017). "Neoteny and social cognition: a neuroscientific perspective on 
embodiment", Durt et al. 309-332. 
GALLESE, Vittorio and CUCCIO, Valentina (2015). "The Paradigmatic Body. Embodied 
Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language", T. METZINGER and J. WINDT 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
LXIII 
 
(éds). Open MIND, Frankfurt am Main, MIND Group. 
GALLESE, Vittorio, and LAKOFF, George (2005). "The brain's concepts: the role of the sensory-
motor system in reason and language", Cognitive Neuropsychology 22, 455-479. 
GENTILUCCI, Maurizio and CORBALLIS Michael (2006). "From manual gesture to speech: a 
gradual transition", Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30, 949-960. 
GOODY, Jack and WATT, Ian (1963). "The consequences of literacy", Comparative studies in 
society and history 5(3), 304-345. 
GRAMMONT, Maurice (1901). "Onomatopées et mots expressifs", Revue de langues romanes 
44/4, 97-158. 
GRAMMONT, Maurice (1933). Traité de phonétique, Paris : Delagrave. 
HAUK, Olaf, JOHNSRUDE, Ingrid and PULVERMÜLLER, Friedemann (2004). "Somatotopic 
Representation of Action Words in Human Motor and Premotor Cortex", Neuron 41(2), 301-
307. 
HAVELOCK, Eric Alfred (1977). "The preliteracy of the Greeks", New literary history 8(3), 369-
391. 
HINTON, Leanne, NICHOLS, Johanna and OHALA, John (1994) (éds,). Sound Symbolism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
HAMANO, Shoko (1998). The sound-symbolic system of Japanese, Stanford : CSLI. 
HAYNIE, Hannah, BOWERN, Claire and LA PALOMBARA, Hannah (2014). "Sound symbolism in 
the languages of Australia", PlosOne 9(4), 1-16. 
HJELMSLEV, Louis (1928). Principes de grammaire générale, Copenhagen : Munksgaard. 
HUMBOLDT, Wilhelm von (1822). "Über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen und ihren 
Einfluss auf die Ideenentwicklung", Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften 8, 401-430.  
HUMBOLDT, Wilhelm von (1836). Über die Vielfaltheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und 
ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts, Berlin : Königlichen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften.  
HUTCHINS, Sharon Suzanne (1998). The psychological reality, variability, and compositionality 
of English phonesthemes [thesis], Atlanta: Emory University. 
IMAI, Mutsumi, KITA, Sotaro, NAGUMO, Miho and OKADA, Hiroyuki (2008). "Sound 
symbolism facilitates early verb learning", Cognition 109, 54-65. 
JAKOBSON, Roman (1960). "Why 'mama' and 'papa'?", B. Kaplan & S. Wapner (eds.). 
Perspectives in psychological theory, New York : International Universities Press, 124-134. 
JAKOBSON, Roman (1965). "À la recherche de l’essence du langage", Diogènes 51, 22-38. 
JANCOVICI, Jean-Marc (2017). "La physique et l'économie : amies ou ennemies ?" [Conference 
for the seminar "Questions de Physique" organized by the Alpes section of the French Physical 
Society, Grenoble, 20 November 2017], You Tube, <https://youtu.be/nfRbpqQu6kU> seen on 8 
October 2019. 
JANCOVICI, Jean-Marc (2019). "Jancovici: CO2 ou PIB, il faut choisir" [Conference at 
SciencesPo, Paris, 29.08.2919], You Tube, <https://youtu.be/Vjkq8V5rVy0> seen on 10 
December 2019. 
JESPERSEN, Otto (1922a). Language : its nature, development and origin, London : Allen. 
Signifiances (Signifying), 3(1), XXXVI-LXVIII. 
 
LXIV 
 
JONES, James (1999) "Cultural racism: The intersection of race and culture in intergroup 
conflict", D. A. PRENTICE and D. T. MILLER (éds.). Cultural divides: Understanding and 
overcoming group conflict, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 465-490. 
KANTARTZIS, Katerina, IMAI, Mutsumi and KITA, Sotaro (2011). "Japanese sound-symbolism 
facilitates word learning in English-speaking children", Cognitive science 35, 575-586. 
KLINK, Richard (2000) "Creating brand names with meaning: the use of sound symbolism" 
Marketing Letters 11(1), 5-20. 
KŒNIG, Fredrick et FISCHER, John L. (1980). "Phonetic symbolism and literacy", Language 
sciences 2(2), 309-317. 
KÖHLER, Wolfgang (1929). Gestalt Psychology [1947²], New York : Liveright. 
KOVIĆ, Vanja, PLUNKETT, Kim and WESTERMANN, Gert (2010). “The Shape of Words in the 
Brain”, Cognition 114(1), 19-28. 
KNOEFERLE, Klemens, LI, Jixing, MAGGIONI, Emanuela and SPENCE, Charles (2017). “What 
drives sound symbolism? Different acoustic cues underlie sound-size and sound-shape 
mappings”, Nature Scientific Reports 5562(7), 1-11. 
KWON, Nahyun (2017). "Empirically Observed Iconicity Levels of English Phonaesthemes", 
Public Journal of Semiotics 7(2), 73-93. 
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm (1710). "Brevis designatio meditationum de Originibus Gentium 
ductis potissimum ex indicio linguarum", Miscellanea berolinensia ad incrementum 
scientiarum, Berlin: Papen.  
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm (1712 / 1991). "Epistolica de historia etymologica dissertatio", S. 
GENSINI (ed.). Il naturale e il simbolico: saggio su Leibniz, Roma, Bulzoni, 191-271. 
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm (1765). New Essays on Human Understanding. Id. Latin and 
French philosophical works, Amsterdam-Leipzig: Schrender. 
LOCKE, John (1690). An essay concerning human understanding, London : Basset-Mory. 
LOMONOSOV, Mikhaïl Vassilievitch (1748). Kratkoe rukovodstvo k Imperatorskoĭ [Small 
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